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 JAMIE S. V. MILWAUKEE PUBLIC SCHOOLS: 
URBAN CHALLENGES CAUSE SYSTEMIC 
VIOLATIONS OF THE IDEA 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Child Find
1
 is one of the most important provisions, if not the most 
important provision, of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act 
(IDEA).  Child Find requires states and districts to identify, locate, and 
evaluate all children with disabilities.
2
  The IDEA mandates that a state must 
provide a Free Appropriate Public Education (FAPE) to every child with a 
disability as a prerequisite to receiving federal funding to help educate 
children with disabilities.
3
  The IDEA defines FAPE as ―special education and 
related services.‖4  If a school district violates the Child Find provision, this 
necessarily means that the district did not provide the student an appropriate 
FAPE.
5
  A failure to provide a child access to a FAPE causes a complete 
failure of the IDEA because FAPE is the ―overriding concern of the Act.‖6  
Thus, Child Find is a gate-keeping provision that requires identification of 
children with disabilities.
7
  Identification leads to access to appropriate special 
education and other related services to which all disabled children are entitled 
by the IDEA.
8
 
In Jamie S. v. Milwaukee Public Schools, the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Wisconsin delivered an opinion holding that 
Milwaukee Public Schools (MPS) and the Wisconsin Department of Public 
Instruction (DPI) violated the IDEA by failing to comply with the 
requirements of Child Find.
9
  The court determined the issue of liability; 
 
1. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(3) (2006). 
2. Id. § 1412(a)(3)(A). 
3. Id. § 1412(a)(1). 
4. Id. § 1401(9). 
5. See Dep‘t of Educ. v. Cari Rae S., 158 F. Supp. 2d 1190, 1196 (D. Haw. 2001). 
6. Clay T. v. Walton County Sch. Dist., 952 F. Supp. 817, 821 (M.D. Ga. 1997). 
7. See JOHN W. NORLIN, IDENTIFY, LOCATE AND EVALUATE: CHILD FIND UNDER THE IDEA 
AND SECTION 504, at 1 (2002). 
8. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(A) (mandating that a free appropriate public education must be 
available to ―all children‖ with disabilities). 
9. 519 F. Supp. 2d 870, 903 (E.D. Wis. 2007).  The court also found DPI in violation of IDEA.  
Id.  As part of its oversight responsibilities of DPI of special education, DPI is required to monitor 
school districts and assure each district‘s compliance with federal and state law.  Id. at 873.  A 
complete discussion of DPI‘s liability is beyond the scope of this Note, and MPS will be the focus.  
In addition to violating the IDEA, both MPS and DPI violated related state statutes that effectuate the 
provisions of the IDEA.  See id. at 903, 880.  This Note largely focuses on federal legislation, namely 
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however, before the court enters a judgment, it must determine appropriate 
remedies for the plaintiff class and appropriate sanctions for MPS.
10
 
This Note argues that while the decision of Jamie S.—finding systemic 
violations of MPS‘s Child Find procedures—was justified, the systemic 
violations of MPS are largely due to unique challenges faced by urban school 
districts, like the MPS district.  Part II gives an overview of special education 
law, including its beginnings as a social movement, the more recent legal 
movement, and an extensive discussion of the Child Find mandate.  Part III 
provides a synopsis of the facts of Jamie S. and each of MPS‘s systemic 
violations of the IDEA.  Part IV argues that MPS‘s failure to comply with 
Child Find is rooted in the challenges faced by an urban school district, and 
these challenges make compliance with the IDEA extremely difficult.  Part V 
discusses the remedies and sanctions awarded in the case, including the 
settlement agreement between the plaintiffs and DPI and the remedy imposed 
by the court upon completion of Phase III litigation.  Additionally, Part V 
argues for a new standard for urban school districts: courts should require 
satisfactory compliance instead of 100% compliance, which the IDEA 
currently requires.  Further, in order to achieve satisfactory compliance courts 
must impose tailored remedies that take into account all of the urban 
challenges faced by MPS and similar districts. 
II. BACKGROUND OF THE IDEA 
A. Social Movement 
Early treatment of individuals with disabilities revolved around social 
movements.  Various social movements led the way these individuals were 
treated because there were no legal standards for treatment until the late 
twentieth century.
11
  The earliest treatment of individuals with disabilities 
focused on segregating and removing these individuals from their families and 
communities.
12
  Extreme treatment such as infanticide and shunning was 
common of individuals with disabilities in the seventeenth century.
13
 
By the mid-1900s, institutionalization peaked and was society‘s primary 
way of dealing with individuals with disabilities.
14
  At this time, a publicly 
 
the IDEA. 
10. Id. at 904. 
11. See LARRY D. BARTLETT ET AL., SPECIAL EDUCATION LAW AND PRACTICE IN PUBLIC 
SCHOOLS 5 (2d ed. 2007). 
12. See id. 
13. Id. 
14. See NIKKI L. MURDICK ET AL., SPECIAL EDUCATION LAW 3 (2d ed. 2007). 
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supported institution was in every state.
15
  The goals of institutionalizing 
individuals with disabilities were to contain them and their behavior and to 
protect the communities from which these people came.
16
  These individuals 
were excluded from virtually all activities in the community including public 
schools.
17
  This policy forced institutions to provide lifelong care as it was 
unlikely that an individual with a disability would have the skills to live 
independently.
18
  Mass institutionalization resulted in overcrowding, which 
spurred public concern over the quality of life afforded to individuals with 
disabilities.
19
 
The social movement of deinstitutionalization was society‘s response to 
the quality-of-life concerns.
20
  The movement‘s goal was to release 
individuals with disabilities back into their communities in order to integrate 
them into society to become productive citizens.
21
  During 
deinstitutionalization, parents of children with disabilities became advocates 
by forming powerful local and national support groups aimed at getting their 
children into tax-supported public schools.
22
 
The emergence of the Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s and early 
1970s greatly affected educational services in this nation.
23
  An overarching 
concern for the individual characterized the movement.
24
  There were many 
victories in this era expanding the civil rights of individuals of different 
races.
25
  These victories also affected the rights of individuals with 
disabilities.  Advocates of these individuals used Brown v. Board of 
Education
26
 to oppose the exclusion of individuals with disabilities from 
 
15. Id. 
16. Id. 
17. Id. 
18. Id. 
19. Id. at 3–4.  The source was a national study completed by the American Association on 
Mental Deficiency and examining 134 public institutions.  Id. at 4.  The results indicated that 60% of 
institutions were overcrowded, 50% rated below minimum safety standards, 89% did not meet 
acceptable attendant/resident ratios, 83% did not meet professional staffing requirements, and 60% 
provided insufficient space for education and recreation.  Id. 
20. Id. at 5–6. 
21. Id. 
22. Id. at 6–7. 
23. See MURDICK ET AL., supra note 14, at 8–9. 
24. See id. 
25. See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 
(D.D.C. 1967). 
26. In Brown, the plaintiffs alleged that African-American children who were required to attend 
segregated schools were denied the equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment.  
347 U.S. at 488.  This United States Supreme Court decision overturned Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 
U.S. 537 (1896), in its holding that ―separate but equal‖ schools were inadequate and required that 
the opportunity of education must be made available to all children on equal terms.  Brown, 347 U.S. 
at 488, 495.  This decision provided the basis for future rulings that children with disabilities may not 
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public schools.
27
  This case became ―the basic tenet for later federal 
legislation guaranteeing educational and civil rights for persons with 
disabilities.‖28 
B. Legal Movement 
The progression of each social movement combined with the explosion of 
court decisions
29
 prompted a legal movement to enact legislation to codify and 
expand the foundations of the Civil Rights Movement for individuals with 
disabilities.
30
  Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973
31
 was the legal 
movement‘s first legislative effort.32  Section 504 made it ―illegal to deny 
participation in activities, benefits of programs, or to in any way discriminate 
against a person with a disability solely because of that disability. . . .  
Individuals with disabilities must have equal access to‖ any program or 
activity receiving Federal financial assistance.
33
  Section 504 did not provide 
any funding; it provided only a guarantee of rights.
34
 
1. Education for All Handicapped Children Act 
The Education for All Handicapped Children Act (EAHCA)
35
 was the 
follow-up to Section 504 and laid the foundation for the most significant piece 
of legislation for individuals with disabilities today—the IDEA.36  EAHCA 
 
be excluded from public schools solely based upon having a disability.  See, e.g., Mills v. Bd. of 
Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866, 874–75 (D.D.C. 1972) (preventing schools from further excluding, 
suspending, expelling, reassigning, and transferring students with disabilities out of public schools 
without due process of law). 
27. MURDICK ET AL., supra note 14, at 9. 
28. Id. at 8–9. 
29. See, e.g., Brown, 347 U.S. at 495 (holding ―the doctrine of ‗separate but equal‘ has no 
place‖ in public education); Mills, 348 F. Supp. at 878 (holding that every child is entitled ―a free and 
suitable publicly-supported education regardless of the degree of the child‘s mental, physical or 
emotional disability or impairment‖); Pa. Ass‘n for Retarded Citizens v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 
279, 302 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (enjoining the State of Pennsylvania from denying education to children 
with mental retardation who reside in the state); Hobson, 269 F. Supp. at 513 (declaring the policy of 
mislabeling and segregating African-American students a violation of the school system‘s public 
responsibilities). 
30. MURDICK ET AL., supra note 14, at 14. 
31. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 504, 87 Stat. 355, 394 (codified as 
amended at 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2006)). 
32. MURDICK ET AL., supra note 14, at 14. 
33. JIM YSSELDYKE & BOB ALGOZZINE, THE LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF SPECIAL EDUCATION: 
A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR EVERY TEACHER 11 (2006). 
34. MURDICK ET AL., supra note 14, at 14. 
35. Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 
(codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401–1461 (2006)). 
36. Education of the Handicapped Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. 101-476, 104 Stat. 1103 
(codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (2006)) (renaming the act the Individuals with Disabilities Education 
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improved upon Section 504 in two obvious ways.  First, it combined 
guarantees of rights for individuals with disabilities with federal funding.
37
  
Second, it focused only on school-aged children, while Section 504 covered 
children, employees, and others who may visit a school.
38
 
EAHCA was based on several core principles that still exist in the current 
version of the IDEA.  The first principle, ―zero reject,‖39 establishes that all 
children with disabilities, regardless of severity or type of impairment, are 
entitled to receive a ―free appropriate public education.‖40  The second 
principle, nondiscriminatory assessment, states that all ―testing and evaluation 
materials and procedures utilized for the purposes of evaluation and 
placement of children with disabilities for services under this chapter will be 
selected and administered so as not to be racially or culturally 
discriminatory.‖41 
The third principle requires students with disabilities to be educated in 
their least restrictive environment.
42
  The preferred placement for students 
with disabilities is in the general education classroom with students who are 
not disabled.
43
  Students with disabilities should be removed from that 
environment only when a disability is severe enough that instruction in the 
general education classroom is ineffective.
44
 
Finally, the fourth principle is the requirement of an individualized 
education program (IEP).
45
  An IEP is a written document that describes the 
student‘s level of functioning, goals and objectives, duration of services, and 
evaluation procedures to monitor progress.
46
  Parent participation is vital in 
this process, and EAHCA requires parents to be part of the IEP team.
47
 
 
Act). 
37. ALLAN G. OSBORNE, JR. & CHARLES J. RUSSO, SPECIAL EDUCATION AND THE LAW: A 
GUIDE FOR PRACTITIONERS 10–11 (2d ed. 2006). 
38. Id. 
39. Id. at 10; see also Thomas v. Cincinnati Bd. of Educ., 918 F.2d 618, 620 (6th Cir. 1990) 
(explaining that the EAHCA adopted the ―zero reject‖ principle). 
40. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d) (2006). 
41. Id. § 1412(a)(6)(B). 
42. Id. § 1412(a)(5). 
43. Id. § 1412(a)(5)(A). 
44. Id. 
45. Id. § 1412(a)(4). 
46. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i) (2006). 
47. Id. § 1414(d)(1)(B)(i); MURDICK ET AL., supra note 14, at 24–28; YSSELDYKE & 
ALGOZZINE, supra note 33, at 20. 
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2. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act 
The reauthorization of the EAHCA was amended and renamed the 
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act.
48
  Congress enacted the IDEA in 
1990, amended it in 1997, and reauthorized the law in 2004.
49
  As described 
earlier, the IDEA is much narrower in scope than Section 504.  To qualify for 
services under the IDEA, a child must meet three requirements.  First, the 
child must be between the ages of three and twenty-one years old.
50
  Second, 
the child must have a specifically identifiable disability.
51
  Third, the child 
must show a need for special education services.
52
 
The IDEA aims to improve educational results for individuals with 
disabilities.  The purpose is ―to ensure that all children with disabilities have 
available to them a free appropriate public education that emphasizes special 
education and related services designed to meet their unique needs and 
prepare them for further education, employment, and independent living.‖53  
The IDEA provides federal funding to states for the education of individuals 
with disabilities, provided the states comply with certain goals and 
procedures.
54
 
3. Child Find 
In exchange for federal funds, states must comply with the Child Find 
provision.  This places an affirmative duty on states or local education 
agencies (LEAs) to develop and implement a practical method used to 
identify, locate, and evaluate all children with disabilities residing within the 
state.
55
  The Child Find duty has long been a crucial component of the IDEA 
as it is the gateway to receiving the benefits of other provisions of the Act.  
 
48. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-476, 104 Stat. 1103 
(codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401–1487). 
49. See id.; Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Amendments of 1997, Pub. L. 105-17, 
111 Stat. 37 (adding new amendments to the Act); Individuals with Disabilities Education 
Improvement Act of 2004, Pub. L. 108-446, 118 Stat. 2647 (codified as 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1482).  
To avoid confusion, all three laws will be referred to collectively as the IDEA. 
50. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(A). 
51. See id. § 1401(3)(A)(i).  A child with a specifically identifiable disability is a child ―with 
mental retardation, hearing impairments (including deafness), speech or language impairments, 
visual impairments (including blindness), serious emotional disturbance . . . , orthopedic 
impairments, autism, traumatic brain injury, other health impairments, or specific learning 
disabilities; and who, by reason thereof, needs special education and related services.‖  Id. 
§ 1401(3)(A)(i)–(ii). 
52. Id. § 1401(3)(A)(ii). 
53. Id. § 1400(d)(1)(A). 
54. See id. § 1412(a). 
55. Id. § 1412(a)(3)(A); 34 C.F.R. § 300.111(a)(i) (2008).  States also have enacted provisions 
governing the duties of LEAs.  See, e.g., WIS. STAT. § 115.77 (2007–2008). 
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Unless a child is ―found,‖ meaning he or she is identified as potentially having 
a disability, that student is not entitled to special education services of any 
kind.
56
 
Under the Child Find provisions, states or LEAs are required to 
implement policies and procedures ensuring that: 
 
All children with disabilities residing in the State . . . 
regardless of the severity of their disabilities, and who are in 
need of special education and related services, are identified, 
located, and evaluated and a practical method is developed 
and implemented to determine which children with 
disabilities are currently receiving needed special education 
and related services.
57
 
 
The Child Find provision is very broad in scope, and successful 
compliance is difficult to achieve.
58
  ―Not only must districts establish 
virtually fail-safe procedures to find students with disabilities within the 
school system, but they must also make determined efforts to locate students 
who either are not yet in school or are enrolled in private or parochial 
schools.‖59  In Wisconsin, schools are required to identify, locate, and 
evaluate all children with disabilities from birth through age twenty-one.
60
  
Child Find aims to protect all children who reside in a state, including 
children who attend public and private schools, highly mobile children, 
migrant children, homeless children, and children who are wards of the 
state.
61
 
Child Find also includes ―[c]hildren who are suspected of being a child 
with a disability . . . and in need of special education, even though they are 
advancing from grade to grade.‖62  ―[T]he child find duty is triggered when 
the state or LEA has reason to suspect a disability, and reason to suspect that 
special education services may be needed to address that disability.‖63  If the 
school district fails to act on the child‘s behalf when this duty is triggered, the 
 
56. See D.L. v. District of Columbia, 450 F. Supp. 2d 11, 13–14 (D.D.C. 2006). 
57. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(3)(A) (emphasis added). 
58. NORLIN, supra note 7, at vii. 
59. Id. 
60. WIS. STAT. §§ 115.76(3), 115.77(1m)(a). 
61. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(3); 34 C.F.R. § 300.111(a)(1)(i), (c)(2) (2008). 
62. 34 C.F.R. § 300.111(c)(1) (emphasis added). 
63. Dep‘t of Educ. v. Cari Rae S., 158 F. Supp. 2d 1190, 1194 (D. Haw. 2001) (quoting Corpus 
Christi Indep. Sch. Dist., 31 IDELR 41, 158 (1999) (internal quotations omitted)). 
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district has defaulted in its obligation to identify, locate, and evaluate all 
children with disabilities.
64
 
The Child Find duty is an affirmative one.
65
  A parent‘s failure to request 
a special education evaluation for their child does not relieve the district of its 
duties.
66
  School districts may not await parental demands to evaluate a 
child.
67
  Furthermore, a district‘s unawareness of a student‘s potential 
disability does not relieve the district of its duties; it should have suspected 
the disability.
68
  The IDEA does not provide any guidance to school districts 
on how to comply with Child Find‘s affirmative duty.69  Thus, the issue of 
whether a particular district is in compliance is largely ―in the hands of courts 
and administrative agencies.‖70  Instead of providing specific methods that 
districts must use to comply, the IDEA requires each state to devise a 
―practical method‖ to determine which children are receiving needed special 
education services and which children are not receiving services but should 
be.
71
 
There are varieties of methods that have been used to comply with the 
identification step of Child Find.  The Office for Civil Rights of the United 
States Department of Education has accepted plans including, but not limited 
to, door-to-door surveys, brochures, mailings, public education programs and 
other public meetings, physician referrals, contacts with day care providers, 
and surveys of private school personnel.
72
  Other accepted public awareness 
programs used to identify children with disabilities include medical outreach; 
television advertisements; coordination with hospitals, clinics, and service 
agencies; and periodic school screening.
73
  Using assessment test results to 
screen students has also been found to be an acceptable method.
74
  In Clay T. 
 
64. See id. at 1196. 
65. NORLIN, supra note 7, at vii. 
66. Id. at 1. 
67. Branham v. District of Columbia, 427 F.3d 7, 8 (D.C. Cir. 2005)); Scott v. District of 
Columbia, No. 03-1672 DAR, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14900, at *20 (D.D.C. Mar. 31, 2006) (quoting 
Reid v. District of Columbia, 401 F.3d 516, 518–19 (D.C. Cir. 2005)). 
68. NORLIN, supra note 7, at 1. 
69. Id. at 2.  The Child Find provision is consistent with the rest of the IDEA in that it places 
―excessive focus on process over substance.‖  Samuel R. Bagenstos, Where Have All the Lawsuits 
Gone?  The Shockingly Small Role of the Courts in Implementing the Individuals with Disabilities 
Education Act 2 (Wash. U. Sch. of Law Faculty Working Papers Series No. 08-12-05, Nov. 15, 
2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1302085.  Some critics view this lack of guidance for 
school districts as one of the main downfalls of the federal legislation.  See id. at 1–2. 
70. NORLIN, supra note 7, at 2. 
71. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(3)(A) (2006). 
72. Pamela Wright & Peter Wright, The Child Find Mandate: What Does It Mean to You?, 
WRIGHTSLAW, Sept. 26, 2007, http://www.wrightslaw.com/info/child.find.mandate.htm. 
73. BARTLETT ET AL., supra note 11, at 44. 
74. See RUTH A. WILSON, SPECIAL EDUCATIONAL NEEDS IN THE EARLY YEARS 160–61 
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v. Walton County School District,
75
 the court found that a school district that 
relied upon periodic assessment test results in concluding a student was not 
eligible for special education did not violate Child Find.
76
 
All of these methods have been found to satisfy a school district‘s general 
identification responsibilities; however, if a student is not identified and found 
eligible for special education services in a timely manner, Child Find may still 
be violated.
77
  Additionally, the school district may ―[n]ot use any single 
measure or assessment as the sole criterion for determining whether a child is 
a child with a disability and for determining an appropriate educational 
program for the child.‖78  Instead, the regulations require the district to ―[u]se 
a variety of assessment tools and strategies.‖79 
School districts and public agencies must give written notice whenever 
they propose, refuse to initiate, or change ―the identification, evaluation, or 
educational placement of the child, or the provision of a free appropriate 
public education to the child.‖80  This is a procedural safeguard in place for 
the parents of the child.
81
  A district‘s refusal to evaluate a child after a 
parental request can demonstrate the district had knowledge of a child‘s 
disability, thus violating the evaluation requirement of Child Find if that child 
is later diagnosed with a disability.
82
 
To receive federal funding under Part C (special service from birth to two 
years) of the IDEA, dealing with early intervention of infants and toddlers, 
states are required to establish ―[a] comprehensive child find system . . . 
including a system for making referrals to service providers . . . that ensures 
rigorous standards for appropriately identifying infants and toddlers with 
 
(1998).  For more examples of effective Child Find strategies, see JUDITH A. BONDURANT-UTZ, 
PRACTICAL GUIDE TO ASSESSING INFANTS AND PRESCHOOLERS WITH SPECIAL NEEDS 174–76 
(2002). 
75. 952 F. Supp. 817 (M.D. Ga. 1997). 
76. Id. at 823–24.  Clay, the student in this case, took assessment tests in first, second, and third 
grades without demonstrating any significant decreased academic achievement.  Id. at 819–20.  Clay 
earned low marks in several classes; however, Clay testified that this was due to his failure to 
complete homework.  Id. at 819.  The next year, Clay was diagnosed with a learning disability.  Id. at 
820.  Clay‘s parents asserted that the district failed to comply with Child Find because their son was 
never referred for special education services.  Id. at 820–21.  The court rejected this assertion finding 
the school district‘s screening and assessment procedures in compliance with Child Find.  Id. at 823–
24. 
77. E.g., W.B. v. Matula, 67 F.3d 484, 501 (3d Cir. 1995) (explaining that ―a school off icial 
who failed to carry out his or her ‗child find‘ duty within a reasonable time ‗would understand that 
what he is doing violates that duty‘‖) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)). 
78. 34 C.F.R. § 300.304(b)(2) (2008); see also WILSON, supra note 74, at 164, 169. 
79. 34 C.F.R. § 300.304(b)(1). 
80. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(3)(A)–(B) (2006). 
81. See id. § 1415. 
82. NORLIN, supra note 7, at 9. 
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disabilities for services.‖83  To locate, identify, and evaluate infants and 
toddlers with disabilities, many school districts conduct annual screening days 
for kindergarteners and preschool-aged children.
84
 
Child Find is the first step to providing special education to all children 
who need it.  Meeting the Child Find duty is very ―challenging‖ and requires 
school districts to establish ―fail-safe procedures to find students with 
disabilities.‖85  Compliance challenges are even greater in urban school 
districts like MPS versus smaller, suburban school districts.
86
 
III. THE JAMIE S. DECISION: SYSTEMIC VIOLATIONS OF CHILD FIND 
Jamie S. v. Milwaukee Public Schools began in September 2001, when the 
plaintiffs filed a complaint against MPS and DPI alleging violations of the 
IDEA.
87
  Subsequently, the plaintiffs filed a motion for class certification, 
seeking to proceed on their complaints with class action status.
88
  The court 
entered a decision and order granting class status and defined the class as 
follows: 
 
Those students eligible for special education services from 
the Milwaukee Public School System who are, have been or 
will be either denied or delayed entry or participation in the 
processes, which result in a properly constituted meeting 
between the [individualized education program] team and the 
parents or guardians of the student.
89
 
 
As a result of the plaintiffs‘ class certification, in order to find that the 
defendants violated the rights of the plaintiff class, all violations of the IDEA 
must be ―systemic violations, violations that were not amenable to individual 
exhaustion.‖90 
 
[A] claim is ―systemic‖ if it implicates the integrity or 
reliability of the IDEA dispute resolution procedures 
 
83. 20 U.S.C. § 1435(a)(5) (2006). 
84. OSBORNE & RUSSO, supra note 37, at 40–41. 
85. NORLIN, supra note 7, at vii. 
86. JASON SNIPES ET AL., MDRC FOR THE COUNCIL OF THE GREAT CITY SCH., FOUNDATIONS 
FOR SUCCESS: CASE STUDIES OF HOW URBAN SCHOOL SYSTEMS IMPROVE STUDENT ACHIEVEMENT 
21–29 (2002), available at http://www.cgcs.org/images/Publications/Foundations.pdf; Michael 
Heise, Litigated Learning, Law’s Limit, and Urban School Reform Challenges, 85 N.C. L. REV. 
1419, 1419–24 (2007). 
87. Jamie S. v. Milwaukee Pub. Sch., 519 F. Supp. 2d 870, 871 (E.D. Wis. 2007). 
88. Id. 
89. Id. 
90. Id. at 881. 
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themselves or requires restructuring the education system 
itself in order to comply with the dictates of the Act; but that 
it is not ―systemic‖ if it involves only a substantive claim 
having to do with limited components of a program, and if the 
administrative process is capable of correcting the problem.
91
 
 
The court separated the trial into three phases.  Phase I involved the 
presentation of expert witness testimony.
92
  The plaintiff class presented 
expert testimony to prove that MPS systemically violated the IDEA.
93
  The 
defendants presented expert testimony establishing that its policies and 
practices concerning Child Find complied with the IDEA and that all 
violations alleged by the plaintiffs were not systemic violations.
94
  Upon the 
conclusion of Phase I, the court advised the parties of its reactions to the 
testimony and exhibits.
95
  The court stated that it found the plaintiffs‘ experts 
more persuasive than the defendants‘ experts.96 
Phase II consisted of factual presentations of forty-eight witnesses on 
which the experts formed their respective opinions.
97
  In this phase of the trial, 
the plaintiffs presented testimony of certain members of the plaintiff class and 
illustrated how MPS violated Child Find in each instance.
98
  Testimony from 
the plaintiff class presented ―the reality underlying the foregoing conclusions 
of the experts.‖99  For example, plaintiff Melanie V. was a good student until 
fourth grade.
100
  In fifth grade, she began missing school a lot and felt she was 
―not herself.‖101  Melanie failed the sixth grade.102  During her repeat year, her 
grades did not improve, she wrote notes about killing herself, and she was 
 
91. Id. at 882 (quoting Doe v. Ariz. Dep‘t of Educ., 111 F.3d 678, 682 (9th Cir. 1997)). 
92. Id. at 872. 
93. Id. at 883. 
94. Id. at 885–86. 
95. Id. at 883. 
96. Id.  The plaintiffs presented the testimony of Dr. Diana Rogers Adkinson, an expert in the 
field of special education.  Id.  Dr. Adkinson engaged in a quantitative analysis to ascertain Child 
Find patterns and trends and projected her findings to all of MPS.  Id. at 884.  Specifically, Dr. 
Adkinson opined, ―MPS engaged in a pattern of suspending students as a way of coping with the 
discipline and behavioral problems of students.‖  Id. at 885.  The court accepted her analysis 
methodology, the Child Find trends, and their application to MPS.  Id. at 884–85.  The court also 
noted, and found significant, that MPS failed to produce any evidence to rebut Dr. Adkinson‘s 
findings.  Id. at 883–84.  As a result, ―there [was] no compelling reason not to accept the findings of 
Dr. Rogers Adkinson.‖  Id. at 884. 
97. Id. at 872. 
98. Id. at 889–97. 
99. Id. at 889. 
100. Id. at 890. 
101. Id. 
102. Id. 
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suspended for possessing a razor blade at school.
103
  Melanie was sent to the 
Milwaukee County Mental Health Complex three times in one semester.
104
  At 
this time, MPS conducted a hearing and the school principal forced Melanie 
to enroll in a different school; she did not receive a special education 
referral.
105
  Finally, almost two years after Melanie‘s problems began, she 
received a special education evaluation upon her mother‘s request.106  Melanie 
was determined to be eligible for special education.
107
  The plaintiffs 
presented this testimony to demonstrate MPS‘s violation of the identification 
aspect of Child Find.
108
 
In Phase III of the trial, the plaintiffs and MPS presented evidence on the 
most appropriate remedies and sanctions for MPS‘s systemic violations of 
Child Find.
109
  DPI did not participate in this phase of the litigation because it 
entered into a settlement agreement with the plaintiffs.
110
  This phase of the 
litigation was the most important of the three, as the effectiveness of the 
remedy will have a significant impact on MPS‘s ability to achieve satisfactory 
compliance with the IDEA. 
Upon completion of Phases I and II of the trial, the court concluded that 
MPS violated the IDEA and related state statutes.
111
  These violations 
included a failure to comply with Child Find.
112
  ―MPS failed to adequately 
identify, locate and evaluate children with disabilities in need of special 
education and related services. . . .  [T]he violations of MPS during this 
period . . . were systemic in nature and thus violated the rights of the plaintiff 
class.‖113  The court found that MPS violated the rights of the individual 
plaintiffs, and as a result of the systemic violations, MPS also violated the 
rights of the plaintiff class.
114
  More specifically, the court concluded that 
MPS systemically violated the Child Find mandate in four specific ways.
115
 
First, MPS failed to refer children with a suspected disability in a timely 
manner for an initial evaluation.
116
  Initial evaluations are timely when they 
 
103. Id. 
104. Id. 
105. Id. 
106. Id. 
107. Id. 
108. Id. at 889–90. 
109. See id. at 904; infra Part V. 
110. See Settlement Agreement, Jamie S. v. Milwaukee Pub. Sch., No. 01-C-928 (E.D. Wis. 
Feb. 27, 2008). 
111. Jamie S., 519 F. Supp. 2d at 903. 
112. Id. 
113. Id. 
114. Id. 
115. Id. 
116. Id. 
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occur within ninety days of the student‘s referral.117  Evidence showed that 
from June 2000 to June 2003, 9.9% of all initial evaluations were not 
conducted within the ninety-day time period after referral.
118
  Additionally, 
many cases were marked closed without reason prior to conducting an 
evaluation on the child.
119
 
Second, MPS improperly extended the ninety-day time requirement.
120
  
Extensions of this time requirement may be granted under special 
circumstances.
121
  An extension is appropriate when a child enrolls in a new 
school after the ninety-day evaluation period has begun and before the child‘s 
previous school has determined whether the child has a disability.
122
  The new 
school must show it is making sufficient progress to ensure the evaluation is 
completed, and determine with the child‘s parent or parents a specific time 
when the evaluation will be completed.
123
  An extension may also be 
appropriate if the ―child‘s parent repeatedly fails or refuses to produce the 
child for the evaluation.‖124  MPS demonstrated a pattern of improperly 
extending its ninety-day deadline.
125
  This was largely due to the fact that 
MPS did not conduct any evaluations during the summer months, often 
waiting until October of the following school year.
126
  This is an improper 
extension of the ninety-day evaluation period.
127
 
Third, MPS suspended students in a manner that impeded its ability to 
refer children with suspected disabilities for an initial evaluation.
128
  
Suspensions are indicative of a child having a disability when combined with 
other behavior by the child that also suggest a disability is present.
129
  This 
pattern of behavior should alert a district to suspect a disability, thus 
triggering the Child Find duty to refer the child for an evaluation.
130
  MPS 
systemically failed to complete this task.
131
  For example, one plaintiff 
 
117. Id. at 881.  The IDEA and related Wisconsin statutes now require that evaluations take 
place within sixty days.  20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(1)(C)(i)(I) (2006) (effective July 1, 2005); WIS. STAT. 
§ 115.78(3)(a) (2007–2008). 
118. Jamie S., 519 F. Supp. 2d at 895. 
119. Id. 
120. Id. at 897. 
121. WIS. STAT. § 115.78(3)(b)(1)–(2) (2007–2008). 
122. Id. § 115.78(3)(b)(1). 
123. Id. 
124. Id. 
125. Jamie S., 519 F. Supp. 2d at 884–85. 
126. Id. 
127. See id. at 885. 
128. Id. at 896. 
129. Id. at 898. 
130. See id. 
131. Id. at 903. 
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received forty-four suspensions in first and second grade and fell below the 
school‘s academic standards.132  MPS students in this situation were regularly 
―subject to discipline and suspensions instead of being promptly referred for 
special education.‖133  This is a clear violation of the IDEA, as it should alert a 
teacher that a referral is necessary.
134
 
Fourth, MPS failed to ensure parent or guardian participation at the initial 
evaluation.
135
  The IDEA requires parents of a child with a disability to be part 
of the IEP team.
136
  The school district is required to provide the parent with a 
meaningful opportunity to attend all meetings regarding their child‘s 
identification, evaluation, and placement.
137
  The school must notify parents 
early enough to ensure their opportunity to attend.
138
  Decisions regarding the 
identification, evaluation, and placement of the child can be made in the 
absence of the parent, but only when the school can document its reasonable 
efforts to notify the parent.
139
  Plaintiff Jamie S.‘s mother repeatedly requested 
her daughter be evaluated for special education services.
140
  Finally, Jamie 
was tested for a disability after exhibiting cognitive delays for more than four 
years; however, MPS did not attempt to notify Jamie‘s mother of her 
daughter‘s IEP meeting.141  As a result, she was unable to participate in any 
way in her daughter‘s special education program.142 
Although not a specific violation of Child Find, the court noted that 
MPS‘s procedure to ensure that all children with disabilities are identified and 
located was inadequate.
143
  MPS informed the public about its special 
education programs by disseminating a handbook at the beginning of each 
school year to parents with children enrolled in the MPS district.
144
  Upon 
request, MPS also sent Child Find information to community organizations 
and area clinics.
145
  ―Even though MPS tries to get the word out about its 
 
132. See id. at 896. 
133. Id. 
134. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(1)(B) (2006) (mandating that students with disabilities may be 
suspended for not more than ten days). 
135. Jamie S., 519 F. Supp. 2d at 903. 
136. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(B)(i) (2006). 
137. BARTLETT ET AL., supra note 11, at 25; see also Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 53 (2005) 
(acknowledging that parents are to play a ―significant role‖ in the special education process). 
138. BARTLETT ET AL., supra note 11, at 25. 
139. Id. 
140. Jamie S., 519 F. Supp. 2d at 891. 
141. Id. 
142. See id. 
143. See id. at 893. 
144. Id. 
145. Id. 
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special education services, it is still missing too many children with needs.‖146  
Expert Dr. Diana Rogers Adkinson estimated that MPS missed hundreds of 
students with disabilities.
147
  Disseminating information is required to comply 
with Child Find;
148
 however, if the school district is not identifying and 
locating all children with disabilities by disseminating information, then 
something more is required to meet this goal.
149
  MPS failed to implement 
other methods to achieve compliance with Child Find.
150
 
The court noted that throughout this period,
151
 MPS was aware of its 
duties under Child Find and acknowledged that MPS made efforts to 
discharge these responsibilities.
152
  Its efforts, while made in good faith, were 
inadequate.
153
 
IV. URBAN CHALLENGES: WHY MPS VIOLATED CHILD FIND 
In light of all of the facts in Jamie S., the court‘s holding that MPS 
violated Child Find was undoubtedly the correct decision.  The circumstances 
of the members of the class of plaintiffs clearly supported each systemic 
violation found by the court.
154
  What the court did not address in its opinion 
was what went wrong in the MPS district.  MPS‘s policies and procedures 
would likely achieve full compliance with Child Find in other school districts, 
but for MPS they were wholly inadequate.
155
  The court stated that MPS‘s 
efforts to comply with the IDEA were made in good faith, but the district still 
came up short.
156
  So what went wrong?  Why did MPS‘s method of locating, 
identifying, and evaluating students with disabilities systemically violate its 
Child Find duties under the IDEA?  The systemic failures of MPS are 
attributable to the unique challenges faced by urban school districts like the 
MPS district.
157
 
 
146. Id. 
147. Id. 
148. Id. 
149. See id. 
150. See id. 
151. The time period under consideration during the trial was from September 2000 to June 
2005.  Id. at 872. 
152. Id. at 903–04. 
153. Id. at 904. 
154. See id. at 889–99. 
155. See Doe v. Metro. Nashville Pub. Sch., 9 F. App‘x 453, 456 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding that 
the distribution of informational material to area schools, agencies, and professionals who encounter 
children with disabilities brought this school district in compliance with Child Find). 
156. Jamie S., 519 F. Supp. 2d at 904. 
157. SNIPES ET AL., supra note 86, at 21–29; Heise, supra note 86, at 1419–24. 
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Some argue that ―[t]he appalling outcomes in urban schools are arguably 
the most pronounced social policy problem facing leaders today.‖158  Many 
urban districts acknowledge a simple fact: academic performance is 
unsatisfactory.
159
  The MPS district is no exception; Milwaukee public 
schools are labeled as ―failing.‖160  The minority population represents a 
majority of the students.  In the 2007–2008 school year 87.6% of the student 
population was non-white.
161
  The enrollment of white students has 
consistently declined over the last ten years.
162
  The number of students who 
qualify for free or reduced lunch is the most reliable indicator of how many 
students are from low-income families.  Seventy-seven percent of students in 
MPS qualified for free or reduced lunch.
163
  Individually, 60 of the district‘s 
213 schools had rates over 90%, and about half of the district‘s schools had 
rates over 80%.
164
  Stark academic achievement gaps for low-income and 
minority students remain a defining feature of urban school districts.
165
  It is 
no surprise that since the majority of MPS consists of low-income and 
minority students there is a significant achievement gap between the MPS 
district and the rest of the state. 
The following statistics demonstrate just how wide the achievement gap 
the district faces is.  In the 2007–2008 school year, only 60% of third graders 
in the MPS district were reading at a proficient level.
166
  Even worse, reading 
proficiency fell to 38% in the tenth grade.
167
  A much more impressive 75% of 
tenth graders in the remainder of the state of Wisconsin were reading at a 
 
158. Andrew J. Rotherham & Sara Mead, A New Deal for Urban Public Schools, HARV. L. & 
POL‘Y REV. ONLINE, http://www.hlpronline.com/2007/04/rotherham_mead_01.html (last visited 
May 26, 2009). 
159. SNIPES ET AL., supra note 86, at 21. 
160. DENNIS W. REDOVICH, CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF JOBS & EDUC. IN WIS. & THE U.S., THE 
WAR AGAINST THE MILWAUKEE PUBLIC SCHOOLS 4 (2004).  There has been a steady achievement 
gap between MPS and the state over the last four years.  See DIV. OF RESEARCH & ASSESSMENT, 
MILWAUKEE PUB. SCH. 2007–2008 DISTRICT REPORT CARD 12 chart 14 (2008), available at 
http://www2.milwaukee.k12.wi.us/acctrep/0708/2008_district.pdf [hereinafter DISTRICT REPORT 
CARD].  Overall, many of the MPS‘s 218 schools are ―making little headway in changing their status 
among Wisconsin‘s worst performing schools.‖  Alan J. Borsuk, Suspension Rate Deemed Too High: 
MPS Superintendent Seeks Alternatives in Minor Matters, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Jan. 7, 2008, at 
1B. 
161. See DISTRICT REPORT CARD, supra note 160, at 6 chart 3. 
162. Id. at 5. 
163. Id. at 8 chart 9. 
164. Id. at 8. 
165. JASON SNIPES & AMANDA HORWITZ, COUNCIL OF THE GREAT CITY SCH., RESEARCH 
BRIEF: RECRUITING AND RETAINING EFFECTIVE TEACHERS IN URBAN SCHOOLS 1 (2007), available 
at http://www.cgcs.org/publications/TQ_Brief_final.pdf. 
166. DISTRICT REPORT CARD, supra note 160, at 12 chart 14. 
167. Id. 
2009] URBAN CHALLENGES TO SPECIAL EDUCATION 873 
proficient level in 2007–2008.168  Similar trends follow for mathematics.169  
MPS as a whole has a 42% proficiency rate in math, compared to the state‘s 
74% proficiency in math.
170
 
―A key measure of school performance is the percent of students 
graduating from high school.‖171  The most recent statistics show that the state 
of Wisconsin had a 91% graduation rate, while the MPS district had a 69% 
graduation rate.
172
  To put these numbers in perspective, it is important to note 
that the state target is an 80% graduation rate.
173
  Another important measure 
of school performance is habitual truancy.  More than 75% of high school 
students and nearly 50% of all students in the MPS district are habitually 
truant.
174
  ―[A]n average of 4,000 MPS students [are] unexcused and absent on 
any given school day.‖175  MPS also has a high incidence of poverty and 
unwed pregnancies.
176
  These characteristics are typical of almost all urban 
school districts.
177
 
These statistics make it clear that the characteristics of the students 
themselves create many challenges that suburban schools do not face, or face 
on a much less serious level.
178
  However, challenges to urban districts like 
MPS go much deeper than student demographics; challenges are engrained in 
 
168. See id. 
169. See COUNCIL OF THE GREAT CITY SCH., BEATING THE ODDS: ASSESSMENT RESULTS 
FROM THE 2005–2006 SCHOOL YEAR 279–80 (2006); DISTRICT REPORT CARD, supra note 160, at 
12. 
170. DISTRICT REPORT CARD, supra note 160, at 17 chart 21. 
171. Id. at 28. 
172. Id. at 29 chart 45.  For older statistics on graduation rates, see WIS. DEP‘T OF PUB. 
INSTRUCTION, WISCONSIN SCHOOL PERFORMANCE REPORT, available at http://dpi.state.wi.us/spr/ 
xls/grad03.xls. 
173. DISTRICT REPORT CARD, supra note 160, at 28. 
174. Id. at 25 chart 37.  A habitual truant is defined as ―a pupil who is absent from school 
without an acceptable excuse . . . for part or all of 5 or more days on which school is held during a 
school semester.‖  WIS. STAT. § 118.16(1)(a) (2007–2008). 
175. Dani McClain, Alderman Calls MPS Truancy Efforts “B-R-O-K-E-N,” MILWAUKEE J. 
SENTINEL ONLINE, News and Opinion Blogs, http://www.jsonline.com/blogs/news/31984204.html 
(Sept. 15, 2008).  ―Perhaps the most alarming case in the district is Custer High School, where the 
chronic truancy rate was 98% two years in a row.‖  Dani McClain, Half of MPS Students Regularly 
Skip School, Report Shows, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Sept. 12, 2008, at A1. 
176. George Lightbourn, Milwaukee Public Schools: A City’s Lost Economic Promise, 13 WIS. 
INT. 13, 14 (2004). 
177. Id. 
178. See WIS. DEP‘T OF PUB. INSTRUCTION, SPECIAL EDUCATION DISTRICT PROFILE: 
MILWAUKEE SCHOOL DISTRICT (2006–2007), available at https://www2.dpi.state.wi.us/District 
Profile/Pages/DistrictProfile.aspx (select ―Milwaukee Sch. Dist.‖ and ―2006–2007‖ from the drop 
down menus) [hereinafter SPECIAL EDUCATION DISTRICT PROFILE] (reporting that the Milwaukee 
School District had lower graduation rates, higher dropout rates, more suspensions and expulsions, 
and lower proficiency rates in all subject areas for students receiving special education when 
compared to the State of Wisconsin). 
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the school system itself.
179
  For example, most urban schools are plagued by 
low expectations of students and lack a demanding curriculum.
180
  In a case 
study of several urban school systems, in each district teachers reported 
feeling ―overwhelmed . . . by the substantial challenges faced by many of their 
lower-income and minority students.‖181  This led the staff to lower their 
expectations of achievement for these students.
182
 
Low expectations and low standards may be affecting Child Find efforts 
in MPS because students who have disabilities may be meeting the academic 
standards of the classroom only because standards are so low.
183
  In a 
classroom with higher expectations, these students may fail academically, and 
consequently, teachers or parents could identify earlier those who are failing 
as the result of a suspected disability.  While low standards are a problem for 
all students in urban districts, they are a particularly severe problem for 
students with disabilities.
184
  ―The importance of early identification . . . for 
any child who may have special educational needs cannot be over-
emphasized.  The earlier action is taken, the more responsive the child is 
likely to be.‖185 
Special education teaches students with disabilities ways to cope with 
their impairments and identifies accommodations that make educational 
success more likely.  If students with disabilities never receive special 
education services, they are not learning ways to succeed in the workforce 
despite having disabilities.  A school district‘s sub-par standards may conceal 
students‘ disabilities because even students with learning impairments may be 
capable of reaching such low standards.  As soon as these children leave the 
school district by graduating or dropping out of high school, they will be 
faced with average expectations, which are much higher than the low 
standards of their school district.  This is likely when a disability will present 
itself—when it is too late to receive special education services.  Students with 
disabilities who never receive special education are likely to develop 
 
179. WIS. DEP‘T OF PUB. INSTRUCTION, ADEQUATE YEARLY PROGRESS REVIEW SUMMARY: 
MILWAUKEE SCHOOL DISTRICT (2007), available at http://www2.dpi.state.wi.us/sifi/ayp_summary. 
asp?year=2007&districtcd=3619 (finding that reading and mathematics in the Milwaukee School 
District were at unsatisfactory levels and did not meet adequate yearly progress). 
180. SNIPES ET AL., supra note 86, at 25. 
181. Id. 
182. Id. 
183. See id. 
184. See SPECIAL EDUCATION DISTRICT PROFILE, supra note 178 (reporting statistics that 
show the students that are identified as having disabilities in the Milwaukee School District are 
significantly less proficient in reading and math than students with disabilities in the rest of the State 
of Wisconsin). 
185. WILSON, supra note 74, at 158 (quoting CODE OF PRACTICE ON THE IDENTIFICATION & 
ASSESSMENT OF SPECIAL EDUCATIONAL NEEDS 10 (1994)). 
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secondary handicaps and function at a level well below average learning and 
development.
186
  Additionally, students with disabilities who are never 
formally diagnosed are doomed for failure in light of the fact that the largest 
achievement gap among all student subgroups is between students with 
disabilities (those who actually participate in special education) and general 
education students.
187
  Although there are no statistics to prove it, it is logical 
to assume that the achievement gap between students with disabilities who 
never receive special education and general education students is even wider. 
There are often high rates of student mobility in urban districts.
188
  This is 
especially problematic in Milwaukee where public school choice is available 
to all students.
189
  In MPS, one of every five high school students transfers to 
another school during the year.
190
  ―Schools that receive large numbers of new 
students during the school year often experience greater academic challenges 
in serving these students.‖191  Greater academic challenges result in part from 
inconsistent instructional strategies.  Undoubtedly, every teacher and school 
approaches the curriculum differently; thus, when a student jumps from 
school to school constantly switching teachers, this creates inconsistencies 
that negatively affect student learning.
192
  Also, it takes time for a teacher to 
become familiar with a student‘s style of learning.  When faced with a new 
student, the teacher is unfamiliar with the student‘s typical level of 
achievement and as a result, it may take the full school year, possibly longer, 
to recognize whether a particular student is over or under-achieving relative to 
past performances.
193
 
There is high teacher mobility in urban school districts as well.
194
  Overall, 
―[t]hirty-three percent of new teachers leave teaching within the first three 
years.‖195  This trend is even more severe in urban school districts.  The 
 
186. Id. 
187. DISTRICT REPORT CARD, supra note 160, at 16. 
188. SNIPES ET AL., supra note 86, at 26; SNIPES & HORWITZ, supra note 165, at 3. 
189. Public school choice allows parents to ―list up to three schools they would like their 
children to attend.‖  DAVID DODENHOFF, WIS. POLICY RESEARCH INST., FIXING THE MILWAUKEE 
PUBLIC SCHOOLS: THE LIMITS OF PARENT-DRIVEN REFORM 5 (2007).  In 2006, almost 17,000 
parents utilized their school choice rights, and nearly 95% of parents received their first choice 
school.  Id.  The theory behind school choice is that the more parents who exercise their option to 
choose, the more the education system will operate like a marketplace, which will positively impact 
school improvement and student achievement.  Id. at 4.  However, estimates of only about 10% of 
MPS parents are utilizing school choice by actively choosing a school, choosing between two or 
more schools, and considering academic factors in their choice.  Id. at 8–9. 
190. DISTRICT REPORT CARD, supra note 160, at 9 chart 12. 
191. Id. at 9. 
192. SNIPES ET AL., supra note 86, at 26. 
193. See SNIPES & HORWITZ, supra note 165, at 2. 
194. Id. at 4. 
195. Id. 
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turnover rate of teachers in high-poverty, urban schools is 70% higher than in 
school districts with low-poverty rates.
196
  Even more troubling is the fact that 
the most effective teachers are also the most likely to leave the profession.  
Research shows that the most academically qualified teachers and those who 
work in ―hard-to-staff‖ areas, meaning those who work with high 
concentrations of disadvantaged children, are the most likely to leave.
197
  
Urban school districts have become ―training grounds‖ for inexperienced 
teachers who then move out of the district and on to more affluent and less 
troubled areas as soon as they can.
198
 
High teacher and student mobility is particularly problematic in achieving 
Child Find compliance.  A large portion of identification of students with 
disabilities comes from teacher referrals.
199
  This is because the classroom 
teachers spend the most time with the students and are the most familiar with 
a student‘s academic ability and achievement.  This dependency on teacher 
referrals is even greater in urban school districts because of decreased parental 
involvement.
200
 
If students and teachers are constantly moving in and out of school 
districts, they are unable to develop a meaningful classroom relationship.
201
  
Teachers struggle to keep track of the students in their classrooms and 
consequently are unable to identify and refer students with disabilities for 
evaluations because they are unfamiliar with the student‘s typical level of 
achievement.  Tracking a student‘s progress from year to year is the most 
reliable way for a teacher to recognize a student with a disability.
202
  It is 
extremely difficult to track a student if the student is hopping from school to 
 
196. Id.  For example, ―[i]n New York City, only 28[%] of teachers were teaching in the same 
school after five years, compared with 43[%] of teachers in suburban schools throughout New York 
State.‖  Id. 
197. U.S. DEP‘T OF EDUC., ATTRACTING, DEVELOPING AND RETAINING EFFECTIVE 
TEACHERS: BACKGROUND REPORT FOR THE UNITED STATES 50 (2004), available at 
http://www.nctq.org/p/publications/docs/us_bkgrd_reprt_20071129024238.pdf. 
198. SNIPES & HORWITZ, supra note 165, at 9; U.S. DEP‘T OF EDUC., supra note 197, at 52 (―A 
recent study of nearly 400,000 teachers . . . found that teachers who choose to change districts are 
more likely to take a job where there are fewer minorities, lower poverty rates and higher student 
achievement.‖). 
199. ROGER PIERANGELO & GEORGE GIULIANI, 100 FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ABOUT 
THE SPECIAL EDUCATION PROCESS 22 (2007); see Eve Joan Kelemen Lohnas, Assessing Learning 
Handicapped Student Performance Through Time-Series Analysis of Curriculum-Based 
Measurement Techniques: Monte Carlo Simulation Study (Dec. 1988) 149 (unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, University of California, Santa Barbara) (on file with author) (finding support for the 
previous theory that a teacher‘s decision to refer a student is the central factor in special education 
placement). 
200. DODENHOFF, supra note 189, at 1. 
201. See SNIPES ET AL., supra note 86, at 26. 
202. Kelemen Lohnas, supra note 199, at 149–50 (finding that the best predictor of referral was 
the teacher‘s evaluation of the student‘s ability to perform).  
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school, especially in a school district with a large student population.
203
  Thus, 
with increased dependency on teacher referrals and high student and teacher 
mobility inhibiting a meaningful relationship, many students likely go 
unidentified as having, or suspected of having, a disability.
204
  This can 
profoundly affect a school district‘s level of compliance with Child Find. 
As stated above, teachers are a large source of special education 
referrals.
205
  Through frequent referrals of their own children for evaluations, 
parents also play a significant role in discharging a school‘s Child Find 
duties.
206
  Additionally, the school district needs a parent‘s or guardian‘s 
consent for an evaluation.
207
  Thus, a non-responsive parent can halt the 
diagnostic process despite the existence of a referral for an evaluation.  This 
becomes problematic in urban school districts because parents are less 
involved in their child‘s education.208  Many parents of students in MPS are 
considered ―disadvantaged.‖209  The disadvantaged include minority and 
single parents and those with limited income, education, or English-language 
proficiency.
210
  Overall, all of these categories are indicators of decreased 
parental involvement in their child‘s education and MPS‘s ―numbers are 
substantially less favorable than those in the U.S. at large.‖211  In the MPS 
district, only 11% of parents of fourteen- through seventeen-year-olds are 
actively involved both at school and at home.
212
 
Parents with children in urban school districts are much less likely to refer 
their children for special education evaluations because this would require 
involvement in their child‘s education.213  This involvement would include a 
parent monitoring his or her child‘s academic progress, speaking with a 
teacher or administrator to request an evaluation, and explaining exactly why 
the parent suspects his or her child of having a disability.  Parental 
involvement of this type is unlikely in urban districts.
214
  Thus, a large referral 
 
203. MPS‘s total student enrollment in the 2008–2009 school year was 85,369.  DISTRICT 
REPORT CARD, supra note 160, at 5 chart 1. 
204. See Kelemen Lohnas, supra note 199, at 149. 
205. Id. at 149–50. 
206. PIERANGELO & GIULIANI, supra note 199, at 22. 
207. 34 C.F.R. § 300.300(a)(1)(i) (2008). 
208. DODENHOFF, supra note 189, at 6. 
209. Id. 
210. See id. 
211. Id. at tbl.1 (reporting 55% minorities, 18.5% of families with children are living below the 
poverty line, 19% of parents speak languages other than English, 58% are single-parent families, and 
20% of adults have less than a high school diploma). 
212. Id. at 2 (reporting on parental involvement of children in the fourteen- to seventeen-year-
old age group). 
213. See id. at 6. 
214. See id. at 2. 
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source is severely decreased or eliminated, making compliance with Child 
Find even more difficult because this burden shifts to the school district.  It is 
unlikely that teacher referrals are picking up all the slack, and as a result, 
many students are not referred and go unevaluated. 
A final, and likely the most significant, contributor to MPS‘s systemic 
violation of Child Find is the myriad of issues and needs faced by the 
district.
215
  Urban school districts, like the students they educate, do not face 
one or two challenges but a constellation of barriers to effectively educating 
students with and without disabilities.
216
  In addition to the issues mentioned 
above—widening achievement gap, high student and teacher mobility, and 
decreased parental involvement—further challenges include budget 
constraints, deteriorating facilities, decreased public confidence, and negative 
racial attitudes.
217
  In a recent survey, all of America‘s major urban public 
school systems were asked to identify what they believed to be the most 
pressing needs faced by their urban district.
218
  Special education needs were 
ranked twenty-third out of forty-three listed.
219
  This report demonstrates that 
while special education is among the most pressing needs, it is nowhere near 
the top of any school district‘s priority list.220  It is probable that this is the key 
problem MPS faces in its failed efforts to comply with Child Find.
221
  If 
compliance with Child Find was the only problem MPS faced, it likely would 
have implemented a reform strategy and improved its compliance.
222
  
However, if leaders in the district do not make compliance with Child Find a 
top priority, no reform or improvement strategies will be implemented, and 
children will remain without special education services. 
 
215. JASON SNIPES ET AL., COUNCIL OF THE GREAT CITY SCH., CRITICAL TRENDS IN URBAN 
EDUCATION: SIXTH SURVEY OF AMERICA‘S GREAT CITY SCHOOLS 5–6 fig.4 (2006) available at 
http://www.cgcs.org/pdfs/06_07AR.pdf. 
216. See Rotherham & Mead, supra note 158. 
217. See generally SNIPES ET AL., supra note 86. 
218. SNIPES ET AL., supra note 215, at 5–6 fig.4. 
219. Id. at 6 fig.4. 
220. Id.  For example, MPS recently spent $27,144 to purchase iPods to try and attract more 
students to eat the free breakfast offered at school.  Charlie Sykes, Sykes Writes, IPODS?, available 
at http://www.620wtmj.com/shows/charliesykes/35058319.html (Nov. 25, 2008).  In the midst of 
pending class action litigation the district would have been wise to spend its money on improving its 
Child Find procedures instead.  This type of frivolous spending does little to send the message to the 
plaintiff class that it is making serious efforts to reform the special education procedures to ensure 
future compliance with the IDEA. 
221. SNIPES ET AL., supra note 215, at 5–6 fig.4. 
222. See id. at 11 (finding that current reforms and improvement strategies are making a 
difference in school systems). 
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V. PHASE III: REMEDIES AND SANCTIONS 
Finally, the court addressed the issue of remedies and sanctions in Phase 
III of the trial.
223
  At the end of its decision in Phase II of the trial, the court 
encouraged the parties to renew settlement efforts to try to reach a mutually 
agreeable solution regarding remedies and sanctions.
224
  The court was very 
clear in its desire to avoid a court-imposed resolution in order to expedite the 
process and curtail litigation costs.
225
  DPI took seriously Judge Goodstein‘s 
open endorsement of negotiating a mutually agreeable settlement to avoid 
further litigation costs.
226
  Unfortunately, MPS did not take his words to heart.  
On November 6, 2008, more than seven years after the plaintiffs filed the 
complaint in this case Phase III of the trial began.
227
 
A. DPI’s Settlement 
The plaintiff class and DPI reached a settlement agreement of which the 
court approved.
228
  Although DPI as a party defendant was not the focus of 
this Note, the terms of its settlement agreement will have a significant impact 
on the plaintiff class and all other students eligible for special education in 
MPS.  The agreement awarded the plaintiffs declaratory and injunctive relief; 
aside from attorneys‘ fees, the plaintiffs did not seek any money damages.229  
The highlights of the agreement include the following: 
1.  Dr. W. Alan Coulter was appointed as an independent outside expert 
funded by DPI to monitor MPS to ensure compliance with its federal and state 
special education obligations.
230
 
2.  The independent expert must conduct a review policy and procedures 
in MPS and conduct a needs assessment regarding Child Find.  The expert 
will oversee the creation of a compliance plan to achieve performance 
standards in the MPS district and have the authority to ensure that those 
standards are met.
231
 
3.  The parties established a compliance plan and measurable outcome 
standards for MPS‘s future performance with respect to timely initial 
 
223. Jamie S. v. Milwaukee Pub. Sch., 519 F. Supp. 2d 870, 904 (E.D. Wis. 2007). 
224. Id. 
225. Id. 
226. See id. (encouraging the parties to settle); see also Settlement Agreement, supra note 110 
(DPI settles.) 
227. Jamie S. v. Milwaukee Pub. Sch., No. 01-C-928 (E.D. Wis. Aug. 29, 2008) (scheduling 
order). 
228. Jamie S. v. Milwaukee Pub. Sch., No. 01-C-928 (E.D. Wis. July 28, 2008) (order granting 
approval of class settlement). 
229. See Settlement Agreement, supra note 110, at exhibit A. 
230. Id. at 7–12. 
231. Id. 
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evaluations, parental participation in IEP meetings, referral of students who 
reach a set number of suspensions in a school year to an early intervention 
programs that will address the student‘s academic or behavior issues, and 
referral of students who are retained in a given school year to the early 
intervention program.
232
 
4.  DPI agreed to order MPS to provide training to staff on indicators of 
special education needs, referral procedures, and Child Find obligations.
233
 
5.  The creation of a parent trainer position funded by DPI housed at 
F.A.C.E.T.S.
234
 to provide training and support to MPS parents.
235
 
6.  Finally, DPI agreed to pay $475,000 in attorneys‘ fees to the plaintiff‘s 
counsel.
236
 
In response to the settlement agreement, State Superintendent Elizabeth 
Burmaster stated that ―[b]y settling this long standing lawsuit, [DPI] can 
continue moving forward in building successful learning experiences for all 
students in MPS. . . .  [W]e are getting back to serving the needs of all MPS 
students in the classroom, instead of continuing to debate the issues in the 
court room.‖237 
B. Urban Remedies: Bringing MPS into Satisfactory Compliance with the 
IDEA 
As of the date of publication of this Note, the parties litigated and briefed 
the remedies portion of the trial;
238
 however, due to the complexity of the case 
the court had not yet issued its decision.  In cases like Jamie S., brought under 
the IDEA, a court is empowered to ―grant such relief as the court determines 
 
232. Id. at 4–7. 
233. Id. at 13. 
234. See Wisconsin Family Assistance Center for Education, Training and Support, 
http://www.wifacets.org/programs09.html (last visited May 26, 2009).  F.A.C.E.T.S. is an acronym 
for the Wisconsin Family Assistance Center for Education, Training and Support, Inc., which is a 
nonprofit organization serving Wisconsin children and adults with disabilities, their families, and 
those who support them.  Id. 
235. The settlement agreement states that the parent trainer position will not exceed an annual 
cost of $75,000 and the total cost is not to exceed $300,000.  Settlement Agreement, supra note 110, 
at 13. 
236. Id. at 18. 
237. Press Release, Wis. Dep‘t of Pub. Instruction, DPI, DRW and DPI Agree to Special 
Education Lawsuit Settlement, MPS Has Not Reached an Agreement (Apr. 7, 2008), available at 
http://dpi.wi.gov/eis/pdf/dpi2008_64.pdf. 
238. The evidentiary portion of Phase III commenced on November 6, 2008, and concluded on 
November 14, 2008.  Jamie S. v. Milwaukee Pub. Sch., No. 01-C-928 (E.D. Wis. Aug. 29, 2008) 
(scheduling order).  At the close of trial, the court established a post-hearing briefing schedule and 
requested that the parties address certain questions in their post-trial briefs.  The post-hearing briefing 
closed on February 9, 2009.  Jamie S. v. Milwaukee Pub. Sch., No. 01-C-928 (E.D. Wis. Nov. 17, 
2008) (post-Phase III scheduling order). 
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is appropriate.‖239  Courts have the authority ―to impose a broad range of 
equitable remedies.‖240  As a result, it is difficult to speculate about what 
remedies the court will impose because it has such broad discretion.  There is, 
however, a large body of case law that provides some guidance as to what 
remedies courts typically impose upon finding a violation of the IDEA.
241
  
However, if the court in this case imposes a generic remedy dictated by case 
law, it will almost surely prove unsuccessful.  The key to remedying MPS‘s 
systemic Child Find violations is a remedy that is carefully tailored to MPS‘s 
unique urban challenges.  Further, a court must be willing to hold MPS, and 
other urban school districts, to a standard of substantial compliance instead of 
 
239. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii) (2006). 
240. NORLIN, supra note 7, at 15. 
241. By the time this Note is published, the court likely will have issued its decision of Phase 
III of the trial.  Thus, an in-depth discussion speculating what remedies the court may impose will 
likely be a moot one.  However, a brief overview of the remedies available under the IDEA may 
provide useful background information to help put the court‘s decision into context.  
Since 1975, there have been steady increases in the relief awarded to children with disabilities 
under the IDEA.  Stephen C. Shannon, Note, The Individuals With Disabilities Education Act: 
Determining “Appropriate Relief” in a Post-Gwinnett Era, 85 VA. L. REV. 853, 854 (1999).  The 
most traditional form of relief for FAPE violations, which would include MPS‘s Child Find 
violation, is injunctive relief in the form of ordering an appropriate placement for a child or 
developing an appropriate IEP for the student.  Taylor v. Honig, 910 F.2d 627, 628 (9th Cir. 1990) ; 
Miener v. Missouri, 673 F.2d 969, 979 (8th Cir. 1982); Anderson v. Thompson, 658 F.2d 1205, 
1211–12 (7th Cir. 1981).  One court noted that this form of injunctive relief is the most consistent 
with the goals of the IDEA, which explains why many courts are comfortable awarding this type of 
relief.  See Marvin H. v. Austin Indep. Sch. Dist., 714 F.2d 1348, 1356 (5th Cir. 1983). 
Compensatory education is another possible remedy that awards extra educational services 
beyond the services normally due to a student under state law.  MITCHELL L. YELL, THE LAW AND 
SPECIAL EDUCATION 366–67 (2d ed. 2006).  This remedy is designed to make up for students‘ lost 
progress because of previous denials of FAPE.  Id.  As a result, compensatory education typically 
extends a student‘s eligibility for educational services beyond age twenty-one.  Id. at 367. 
 Tuition reimbursement is another available remedy and is commonly awarded to compensate 
parents for the costs of placing their child in a private school as a result of the public school failing to 
provide their child a FAPE.  Id. at 363.  This remedy is appropriate only when parents can afford to 
place their child in a private school.  See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) (2006).  However, when 
parents cannot afford to place their children in private schools, awarding compensatory education is a 
more appropriate remedy.  Meiner v. Missouri, 800 F.2d 749, 753 (8th Cir. 1986). 
Retroactive tuition reimbursement is one of the few codified remedies included in the IDEA.  
20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii).  Although not included in the original text of the law, reimbursement 
has been determined appropriate in cases where the school district fails to conduct ―sufficient ‗child-
find‘‖ activities or upon finding ―sufficiently serious procedural failures.‖  Doe v. Metro. Nashville 
Pub. Sch., 133 F.3d 384, 388 (6th Cir. 1998) (reversing on other grounds).  Courts have recognized 
other forms of reimbursement as remedies for Child Find violations as well.  For example, in 
Department of Education v. Cari Rae S., the school district was required to reimburse the plaintiffs 
for hospitalization costs incurred as a result of an especially egregious Child Find violation.  See 158 
F. Supp. 2d 1190, 1200 (D. Haw. 2001). 
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100% compliance.  Only this will facilitate MPS in meeting its Child Find 
duties.
242
 
As they did in their settlement with DPI, the plaintiffs sought only 
declaratory and injunctive relief; the only money damages sought are 
attorney‘s fees and costs.243  The plaintiffs filed a motion seeking interim 
attorney‘s fees and costs incurred from the beginning of litigation through the 
end of September 2007.
244
  The IDEA codifies attorney‘s fees as an 
appropriate remedy for the ―prevailing party.‖245  The prevailing party seeking 
the attorney‘s fees must secure a judgment on the merits of at least some of 
the party‘s claims.246  Further, interim attorney‘s fees are appropriate ―once a 
plaintiff obtains substantive relief that is not defeasible by further 
proceedings.‖247  The defendants‘ potential liability for attorney‘s fees is 
extremely important in a case like this where the ―potential liability for 
fees . . . can be as significant as, and sometimes even more significant than, 
their potential liability on the merits.‖248 
In their motion for interim attorney‘s fees and costs the plaintiffs sought 
―$1,200,891.32 in attorneys‘ fees and $119,007.57 in costs incurred through 
the end of September 2007.‖249  In Jamie S., the court decided the question of 
liability when it issued its decision and order in Phase II of the trial.
250
  It is 
 
242. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(3)(A); 34 C.F.R. § 300.111 (2008). 
243. Settlement Agreement, supra note 110, at exhibit A; Jamie S. v. Milwaukee Bd. Sch. 
Dirs., No. 1-C-928, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66447, at *2 (E.D. Wis. Aug. 15, 2008). 
244. Jamie S., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66447, at *5.  The plaintiffs likely will recover the 
remaining attorney‘s fees and costs upon the court‘s issuance of its decision of Phase III of the trial.  
245. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(I). 
246. Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep‘t of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 
598, 603 (2001) (quoting Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 U.S. 754, 758 (1980)). 
247. Jamie S., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66447, at *4 (quoting Dupuy v. Samuels, 423 F.3d 714, 
719 (7th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
248. Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 734 (1986).  This is true because attorney‘s fees are likely 
the only form of monetary compensation the parents of the students will receive.  Only in 
―exceptional situations‖ are parents entitled to monetary damages.  Pamela Wright & Peter Wright, 
Class Action Lawsuit: Judge Orders Sanctions Against School District, Remedies for Kids, 
WRIGHTSLAW, Oct. 14, 2007, http://www.wrightslaw.com/law/art/wi.jamie.mps/wdpi.htm; see, e.g., 
W.B. v. Matula, 63 F.3d 484, 495 (3d Cir. 1995) (awarding monetary damages but cautioning lower 
courts that compensatory damages may be an inferior remedy to compensatory education or tuition 
reimbursement).  Many courts have determined that monetary damages are not available to parents 
because that type of remedy does not further the goal of providing education for students with 
disabilities.  See, e.g., Anderson v. Thompson, 658 F.2d 1205, 1213 (7th Cir. 1981) (determining that 
educational programs would suffer if school officials hesitated to implement educational reforms for 
fear of exposing themselves to monetary liability and this would ultimately ―hinder rather than help 
the very children for whose benefit [EAHCA] was enacted‖).  As previously noted, the plaintiff class 
did not seek any monetary damages other than attorney‘s fees.  Settlement Agreement, supra note 
110, at exhibit A. 
249. Jamie S., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66447, at *5. 
250. Jamie S. v. Milwaukee Pub. Sch., 519 F. Supp. 2d 870, 903 (E.D. Wis. 2007). 
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clear that the ―plaintiffs have prevailed.  There is nothing that could be 
reasonably expected to occur in Phase III that would remove such status from 
the plaintiffs.‖251  Thus, the court granted the plaintiffs‘ motion for interim 
attorney‘s fees but made several reductions to the original amount the 
plaintiffs‘ requested.252  The court awarded a total of $934,123.96 in interim 
attorneys‘ fees.253  After subtracting the $475,000 that DPI agreed to pay in its 
settlement with the plaintiffs,
254
 MPS‘s total obligation was $459,123.96.255 
The court denied the plaintiffs‘ request for costs because the district‘s 
local rules explicitly state that costs are not recoverable until after the entry of 
a judgment.
256
  Thus, the court denied the plaintiffs‘ request for costs without 
prejudice as the any amount awarded is premature until a judgment is 
entered.
257
 
It is reasonable to anticipate that MPS will take the position that it should 
not have been found liable and should not be sanctioned or ordered to engage 
in widespread remedial efforts within the school system because of the 
extraordinary challenges MPS faced and continues to face as a result of being 
an urban district and because its efforts to comply with the IDEA were made 
in ―good faith.‖258  While MPS warrants special attention, it does not deserve 
special treatment.  When viewed in light of the totality of the circumstances 
facing MPS, identifying, locating, and evaluating all children with disabilities 
may seem like an unreasonable burden.  However, the way the IDEA and case 
law stand today, extrinsic factors—even difficult ones—are not taken into 
account in determining if a district is in compliance with the law.
259
 
The IDEA is clear in its purpose: ―to ensure that all children with 
disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public 
education . . . designed to meet their unique needs and prepare them for 
further education, employment, and independent living.‖260  MPS should be 
 
251. Jamie S., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66447, at *4–5. 
252. Id. at *10–23.  The court reduced the hourly rate for paralegals and law clerks from $80.00 
per hour to $50.00 per hour and from $40.00 per hour to $25.00 per hour, respectively.  Id. at *6, 11.  
The court found further reductions of the total hours claimed warranted.  The court found reductions 
appropriate for certain IEP meetings; time spent in contact with the media; a 5% reduction of hours 
for the portions of the case on which plaintiffs were unsuccessful; and an additional 5% reduction of 
hours for vague entries in the plaintiffs‘ 104-page exhibit it submitted detailing the fees the legal 
team incurred.  Id. at *14, 20, 21–22. 
253. Id. at *22. 
254. Id.; Settlement Agreement, supra note 110, at 18. 
255. Jamie S., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66447, at *22. 
256. Id. 
257. Id. 
258. Jamie S. v. Milwaukee Pub. Sch., 519 F. Supp. 2d 870, 904 (E.D. Wis. 2007). 
259. See 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (2006). 
260. Id. § 1400(d)(1)(A) (emphasis added). 
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required to engage in widespread remedial efforts because it directly advances 
the IDEA‘s goal of ensuring that all children with disabilities are receiving a 
proper education.  The majority of IDEA violations involve an isolated 
incident of a school district depriving one child of appropriate services under 
the IDEA.
261
  In Jamie S., an entire school district, the largest district in the 
state, failed systemwide to comply with the IDEA and it continues to do so.
262
  
As a result, not just one, but hundreds of children are not receiving 
appropriate services;
263
 if left unremedied, potentially thousands of students 
will be affected.  Failing to impose widespread remedies in this case would be 
in direct contravention to the IDEA‘s goal of educating all children by 
allowing MPS to continue failing to provide appropriate services to its 
students. 
As stated, there is no qualifier in the IDEA‘s stated purpose—to educate 
individuals with disabilities—that allows school districts to provide each child 
a FAPE only to the extent its circumstances permit.  Educating all children, 
including children with disabilities, is of utmost importance.
264
  The 
challenges faced by MPS are significant, and these challenges undoubtedly 
make compliance with Child Find more difficult; however, under the IDEA, 
no obstacle encountered by MPS excuses its obligation to provide a child with 
a disability a FAPE.  The bottom line is that MPS fell short of its requisite 
goal of identifying, locating, and evaluating all students with disabilities.  As 
a result of this failure, remedies and sanctions must be imposed. 
The issue is not whether MPS should be required to comply with the 
IDEA; clearly, for the reasons stated above it is imperative that MPS be 
required to comply and resolve its systemic violations.  The more pressing 
issue is determining what constitutes ―satisfactory compliance‖265 for an urban 
district like MPS.  One hundred percent compliance is obviously ideal, but is 
this realistic for urban school districts?  Perhaps something less than 100% 
compliance still constitutes satisfactory compliance, even if it does not under 
the IDEA and current case law, perhaps it should in MPS‘s case.  The IDEA 
presents a paradox for urban school districts: it requires school districts to 
identify, locate, and evaluate all children with disabilities; essentially, the 
IDEA requires perfection.
266
  However, the challenges faced by an urban 
 
261. E.g., Miener v. Missouri, 800 F.2d 749 (8th Cir. 1986); Dep‘t of Educ.  v. Cari Rae S., 158 
F. Supp. 2d 1190 (D. Haw. 2001); Clay T. v. Walton County Sch. Dist., 952 F. Supp. 817 (M.D. Ga. 
1997). 
262. Jamie S., 519 F. Supp. 2d at 903–04. 
263. Id. at 893. 
264. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (explaining that ―education is perhaps 
the most important function of the state and local governments‖). 
265. Jamie S., 519 F. Supp. 2d at 904. 
266. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(3)(A) (2006). 
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school district make it impossible to achieve this standard.  As a result, 
something less than 100% compliance should still constitute satisfactory 
compliance for MPS.  What constitutes something less is likely a fact-
intensive analysis to be determined by a court. 
Even if something less than 100% compliance is acceptable under the 
IDEA, MPS still has a long way to go to enter the realm of satisfactory 
compliance.  At one point, 17% of students identified as having disabilities at 
MPS did not have a current IEP and only 81.1% of evaluations of students 
had been timely completed.
267
  In order to achieve satisfactory compliance a 
court must impose remedies that are carefully tailored to MPS‘s urban 
challenges.  This certainly is no easy task.  First, the court has very little 
relevant precedent to use as guidance.  The number of IDEA class action suits 
is ―remarkably small.‖268  One author‘s research ―uncover[ed] less than 100 
cases in which class actions had ever been certified to pursue claims under the 
IDEA.‖269  Secondly, imposing sanctions to remedy a large urban school 
district‘s systemic violations is a daunting task, and there are no guarantees 
for effectiveness.
270
  Finally, this is a more difficult task because of the 
urgency of the problem.  As noted, if the systemic violations of MPS are not 
remedied, potentially thousands of students with disabilities in MPS will not 
receive special education services.
271
 
In order to bring MPS into full compliance with the IDEA, the court needs 
to evaluate MPS‘s situation in light of its urban challenges.272  In other words, 
the court must sufficiently tailor its remedy to the needs of an urban school 
district.  MPS did not account for its urban challenges in constructing its 
original Child Find procedures, and consequently, the procedures were wholly 
inadequate.  Similarly, if the court makes the same mistake and fails to 
account for urban challenges, its remedy will not correct MPS‘s systemwide 
failures. 
MPS, under the directive of DPI, has been attempting to comply with 
Child Find since the birth of the Jamie S. litigation in 2001.
273
  The court 
noted, ―[a]s DPI continued to insist upon more thorough internal 
accountability procedures, compliance by MPS did improve in some areas, 
but overall, remained uneven.‖274  One of the defendants‘ experts explained 
 
267. Jamie S., 519 F. Supp. 2d at 876. 
268. Bagenstos, supra note 69, at 13. 
269. Id. 
270. The difficulty of this task is evidenced by MPS‘s failing efforts to achieve compliance 
since the advent of this case in 2001.  Jamie S., 519 F. Supp. 2d at 877–80. 
271. Id. at 893. 
272. See supra Part IV. 
273. Jamie S., 519 F. Supp. 2d at 904. 
274. Id. 
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that it takes time for compliance strategies to work, but ―things are 
improving.‖275  By the time the court issues its decision in Phase III it will 
have had nearly two years to assess whether MPS has made any progress 
toward achieving satisfactory compliance.  This certainly will be a factor in 
determining the level of invasiveness and the magnitude of changes required 
by the court-imposed remedy.
276
  Further, the court‘s duty should not end once 
it issues a decision in Phase III of the trial; rather, the court should continue to 
monitor MPS‘s compliance efforts and revisit and modify the remedy it 
imposed if necessary.  This likely is the most efficient way for MPS to 
achieve the highest level of satisfactory compliance with the IDEA. 
Imposing an effective remedy to bring the entire MPS district into 
compliance with Child Find is no small task for the court, especially in light 
of the challenges faced by an urban school district like MPS.
277
  Despite these 
challenges, the IDEA is not wavering in its demand for full compliance in 
order to receive federal funding for special education programs.
278
  This is an 
unattainable standard for urban school districts.  Instead, something less than 
100% compliance—satisfactory compliance—which takes into account a 
school district‘s urban challenges, is the standard by which courts should hold 
urban school districts. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
All states receiving federal assistance under the IDEA are required to have 
in effect policies and procedures to ensure compliance with Child Find.  Child 
Find requires that all children with disabilities residing in the state are 
―identified, located, and evaluated.‖279  In Jamie S., the court determined that 
MPS violated its Child Find requirements.  The violations were systemic; 
therefore, MPS violated the rights of the entire class of plaintiffs.  Being a 
large urban school district, MPS faces a myriad of challenges that make 
compliance with Child Find more difficult than in a typical suburban district.  
The key challenges MPS faces are diverse student and parent demographics, 
low expectations and standards, high student and teacher mobility, decreased 
parental involvement, and the low level of priority that special education 
receives. 
Remedies for the plaintiffs and sanctions for the defendants were litigated 
in Phase III of the trial.  The most effective remedy, and the one most 
consistent with the goal of the IDEA, is one that reforms old, ineffective 
 
275. Id. 
276. See id. 
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278. 20 U.S.C. § 1412 (2006). 
279. Id. § 1412(a)(3)(A). 
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policies and procedures and develops new ones that MPS must implement 
throughout the district.  The court must tailor the policies and procedures to 
account for MPS‘s urban challenges, and if necessary, revisit its remedy to 
make necessary modifications.  If this is not done, MPS will continue its 
systemic violations of Child Find, and the Jamie S. litigation will have 
achieved nothing.  Further, MPS should not be required to achieve 100% 
compliance with Child Find but should be held to a new standard of 
substantial compliance. 
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